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1. Introduction 
Unemployment has stood out as a crucial and controversial issue in the UK. Long term and 
unskilled unemployed have assisted powerlessly to the continuous erosion of their welfare 
entitlements, with little prospect of finding work. The New Labour government has promoted 
significant reforms to the labour market in order to move more people from welfare to work. 
These include the working families’ tax credit, changes to the system of national contribution, 
a national minimum wage, and the New Deal, which started as a specific policy directed at 
young people, but was soon extended to older people, single parents and the disabled. The 
unemployment issue has thus attained high priority on the agenda of both mass media and 
public administration, especially during the first New Labour government, opening space for 
further involvement of civil society at large.  
 
In this context, it is of great interest to analyse actors, their initiatives and their action across 
the public and policy domains. The following report aims to synthesize the main findings of 
this analysis for the British case. Amongst others, it strives to reconstruct the main strands of 
public contentions in regard to issues, participating actors and debated policy solutions. It also 
wishes to underscore the role of the European Union and its potential impact on British public 
debates. In particular, we are interested in learning how inclusive these public debates are 
with reference to weak and precariously organized groups such as the unemployed. To this 
end, we will present the findings of the British project in three steps. First, we will give a pic-
ture of unemployment in the UK and describe the established policy instruments and strate-
gies – as a frame for better understanding the role and direction of current policy debates and 
reforms. Second, we will reconstruct the structure of public debates by presenting our data on 
claims-making within a leading British newspaper (the Guardian). Finally, institutionalised 
policy deliberations and various aspects of the public domain will be analysed using inter-
views conducted with important political actors. 
2. Basic parameters of the British policy approach 
 
The fight against unemployment is part and parcel of British public policies since a long time.  
Moreover, we can identify a specific ‘neo-liberal’ approach to combating unemployment and 
dealing with the unemployed. To better understand the debates and policy reforms, it is thus 
beneficial to reflect upon this British policy style before entering the specifics of our findings. 
 
The  liberal  model  of  welfare  state  promotes  means-tested  assistance,  modest  universal 
transfers, or modest social-insurance plans, while encouraging the market either passively or 
actively [Esping-Andersen, 1993]. This model is generally based on poor benefits and strict 
rules for entitlement, targeting a stigmatised clientele of low-income. In particular, it is char-
acterised by 1) low ratio social expenditure/GDP, 2) low social protection from effects of un-
employment, sickness, old age, maternity and lone parenthood, 3) high exposure of house-
holds with below- average incomes to the full costs of market,  4) low replacement levels of 
income by state benefits and pensions, 5) high levels of income inequality and relative pov-
erty, 5) crucial role for means-tested benefits, 6) predominance of  male breadwinner model, 
and 7) a culture of reliance on self-financed, family support and care, supplemented by charity 
and occupational provision  [Ginsburg,  2001].  Of  course,  this  model  provides  an  impor-
tant  instrument  for furthering the analysis of the British welfare state, since it is possible to 
match the theoretical model with actual developments of welfare structures, assessing the ex-
tent to which the UK fits with the liberal model. 
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2.1. Historical background and classification of the British welfare state 
It can be argued that the so-called ‘classic’ British welfare state between WWII and the end of 
the 1970s did not fit properly the liberal model, but it relied on a welfare model establishing 
social rights to a basic, universal level of provision and protection. The extensive provision of 
low  rent  social  housing,  the  national  health  services  and  public  social  services  pro-
vided outstanding protection from the market costs of housing, health and social care. In addi-
tion, the social insurance system, which was accompanied by the development of a safety-net 
role for means-tested benefits, provided almost everyone with a nationally uniform and un-
stigmatised right to subsistence income. However, the New Right long leadership of Thatcher, 
which was established in May 1979 and lasted firmly until November 1990, brought about 
significant changes in the British welfare system.  While  founding  its  leadership  on  a  
pragmatic  and  populist  approach,  the  new government was increasingly driven by neo-
liberal faith in 1) monetarism, 2) supply-side policies, 3) anti-public discourse, and 4) new 
managerialism. 
 
Firstly, the control of inflation replaced ‘full employment’ as the principal goal of economic 
policy, with the consequential  control of the money supply through interest rate rises and 
restraint  of  public  expenditure.  Secondly,  the  New  Right  relied  on  capital  and  labour 
deregulation,  rejection  of  foreign  exchange  controls,  tax  and  benefits  cuts,  anti  unions 
measures, utility privatisation, removal of minimum wage legislation. Thirdly, the New Right 
stood  against  the  provision  of  services  by  public  bodies,  particularly  local  government, 
fostering ideas that undermined the pay and status of public professionals. Lastly, the ‘con-
tract culture’ and the ‘new managerialism’ in the public and third sectors firmly emphasised 
the importance  of  efficiency  and  effectiveness,  aiming  to  changes  which  were  cost-
driven, performance  sensitive  and  commercially  minded.  The  ‘globalisation  discourse’  
offered  a crucial  opportunity  for  the  implementation  and  formulation  of  this  new  eco-
nomic  policy framework. While the anti-inflationary strategy was presented as the only rec-
ipe to face global market competition, mass unemployment was considered to be the neces-
sary evil of this strategy. The restructuring (and consequential job loss in basic industries such 
as steel, coal, railways, telecoms and energy) was hardened by public expenditure restraint, 
since the New Right drastically reduced the resources which  could have answered the needs 
and claims raising from the process of restructuring, with no possibility to reengage the un-
employed within public service employment. 
 
Two main arguments have developed in the social policy literature about the changes which 
have been brought about by the New Right. On the one hand, supporters of the ‘modernisa-
tion view’ have argued that the classic welfare state has been modernised according to the 
needs of global competition  to  achieve  further  efficiency,  while  maintaining  its  main  
welfare  structures. Indeed, the neo-liberal agenda was never widened as far as including 
elimination of housing allowances, private schooling, and private health insurance. On the 
other hand, supporters of the ‘residualisation view’ have emphasised that a deeper transforma-
tion of the British welfare state has been taking place since the early 1980s, leading to the 
reinforcement of liberal regime characteristics. From this point of view, New Right policies  
have  been  completely  shaped  according  to  the  neo-liberal  model,  drawing  on arguments 
about inevitability and economic advantage of globalisation. 
2.2. British policy model 
As I have already stated, post-New Right Britain has been drawing on a ‘neo-liberal’ model 
that combines both residualisation and modernisation. Although it is emphasising the ele-
ments of modernisation, the current New Labour government has not abandoned residualisa-
tion, relying  extensively  on  the  legacies  of  Thatcherism.  As  regards  taxation,  New  La-
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bour  is following on the path of New Right, ruling out ‘tax and spend’ policies and emphasis-
ing the virtue of prudence in public finance. At the same time, increases in indirect taxation 
have enabled the government to finance further spending on welfare-to-work, health service 
and education, since groups lobbying on behalf of lone parents, disabled people and pension-
ers have challenged New plans to cut pensions and welfare benefits. As regards income ine-
quality, New Labour policies aim to achieve positive redistributive effects, particularly in 
favour of low-income households with children. The introduction of a Working Families Tax 
Credit, a new Child Care Tax Allowance, and increases in Income Support for families and 
Child Benefit for the first child, aim to redress effectively the dramatic peak of people living 
on incomes of less than half the average, which was reached during the Thatcher government. 
 
As regards flexibility, New Labour is clearly following the New Right belief in a flexible 
market to stand against global economic competition. The British labour market has emerged 
in the last two decades as one of the least regulated amongst the OECD states, with different 
measures to promote non-standard conditions of employment such as part-time, fixed-term, 
freelance and temporary contracts. These measures have undermined unions’ power, in-
creased work  incentives  for  benefits’  claimants,  abolished  minimum  wages,  contracted  
out  public services  and  taken  at  distance  European  social-democratic  influence.  Never-
theless,  New Labour is ignoring the New Right assumption that flexibility is synonymous of 
deregulation, thereby reversing some policies of previous governments, such as the decision 
to abolish minimum wages regulations in low-pay industries, or the decision not sign up to the 
EU Social Charter. Lastly, as regards privatisation of welfare, the process of state hollowing 
out,  with  gradual  disappearance  of  public  service,  has  been  favoured  by  New  Labour 
measures, in line with a trend started with the New Right. Yet, the New Labour frameworks 
of legal and administrative regulation and of public finance corroborate the British welfare 
state as much as the provision of direct public services, effectively addressing the risk to 
transform the government into a mere financier of privately provided services.  
 
In sum, while it continues to follow the important paths that were drawn by the New Right, 
the New Labour government (like other EU social-democratic  governments) is trying to 
firmly sustain welfare provisions with the crucial aim to protect the weaker parts of the 
population, tackling unemployment, poverty, and income dispersion. It can be argued that 
the British welfare state is currently drawing on a ‘neo-liberal’ model, which is close to 
but different from the conventional liberal model. While emphasising the elements of 
modernisation, the current New Labour government is extensively drawing on the legacies 
of Thatcherism. Economic competitiveness, workfare/labour market policies, and inter-
ventionist governance were already central features of the Conservatives’ strategy be-
tween 1979 and 1997. The New Labour  government has broadened this latter strat-
egy,  although  it  has  clearly  strengthened  its  intervention  in  workfare  and  developing 
measures which deal directly with social exclusion. New Labour is continuing the mone-
tarist and supply-side policies carried  out during Thatcherism. It is  relying on workfare 
policies, emphasising the necessity to raise living conditions of people in low paid em-
ployment through the minimum wage, working families tax credit, child care tax credit 
and wage subsidies. It is promoting interventionist and regulatory governance embracing 
both public service and private finance and contracting for welfare provision. At the same 
time, New Labour is implementing some measures to promote social cohesion and tackle 
social exclusion. 
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3. Unemployment and public policy  
 
Unemployment is definitely not homogeneously distributed across the UK labour force, with 
some groups heavily suffering unemployment (for example, young and unskilled men) and 
other groups virtually immune from it (for example, professional workers). 
• Unemployment  and  Gender:  In  contradiction  with  many  countries  of  Continental 
Europe, in the UK unemployment amongst men is considerably higher than it is amongst 
women. 
• Unemployment and Age: Younger workers have substantially higher unemployment 
rates than their elders. The position of young people has worsened since the 1970s, particu-
larly in comparison to the over-fifties. 
• Unemployment  and  Profession:  Unemployment  rates  amongst  unskilled  and  
semi- skilled worker men are the highest. 
• Unemployment   and   Ethnic   Groups:   Not   surprisingly,   white   suffer   very   low 
unemployment if compared with other ethnic groups. Amongst all ethnic groups, men have 
the highest unemployment rate. 
3.1. Development and structure of unemployment in the UK 
Focusing on the last century, four main significant periods for unemployment can be indi-
cated: 
1.    Before WWI: unemployment rate was around 5%. 
2. The Interwar Time: unemployment rate fluctuated around 9%. 
3. The Post-War Boom (1945-75): unemployment fluctuated around 2.5%. 
4. From the 1970s Recession Onwards: unemployment has been between 7% and 9%.  
 
Unemployment falls when aggregate demand expands and rises when there is a contraction. 
Thus, one possible strategy of government can consist in sustaining an expansion of real de-
mand through an expansionary fiscal policy and reduction of interest rates. However, this 
strategy unavoidably leads to rising inflation and deterioration of trade balance. This explains 
exactly what happened, for example, between 1986 and 1990, when the drop of unemploy-
ment rate from 11% to 7% (thanks to expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, alongside with 
an international boom and a fall in commodity prices) was matched by a sudden increase of 
inflation (which rose from 2.5% to 7.8%) and  a trade balance deficit of 4% of GDP. The 
government, at this point, started a policy contraction. By 1993, unemployment had risen 
back over 10%, but inflation had dropped at 3% alongside with a considerable improvement 
of trade balance. 
 
This pattern of high inflation and trade balance deficit when there is low unemployment, and 
low inflation and positive trade balance when there is high unemployment, is not only the 
basis on which the suffered choices of fiscal and monetary policy of government are founded, 
but the clear indication of the existence of a ‘systemic’ baseline level of unemployment such 
that actual employment should not move below it (otherwise contractionary policies will soon 
be necessary). This systemic baseline level of unemployment is known as the ‘equilibrium 
rate’ or the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment). Although it is difficult 
to detect which particular factors may change the equilibrium rate, as well as to understand its 
precise different numerical dimensions throughout time [Layard et al., 1991: 435-48], it 
seems evident that until the late 1960s both actual and equilibrium unemployment were rela-
tively stable at around 2.5%. Afterwards, until 1980 unemployment was sustained below the 
equilibrium rate, as rising inflation and trade balance worsening show. Yet, the fact that un-
employment rose clearly testifies that fact that the equilibrium rate must have increased even 
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further. Rising unemployment above the (still increasing) equilibrium rate in the first half of 
the 1980s was matched by decreasing inflation and trade   balance surplus.  At the end of the 
1980s unemployment fell relative to a stable equilibrium rate inflation and trade balance 
worsened again. Throughout the 1990s, finally, the equilibrium rate appears to have con-
stantly decreased. This has brought about a parallel decline of actual unemployment, which, 
and at the end of the old millennium, was (and probably still is) a little below the equilibrium 
rate [Nickell, 1999:21]. 
 
While it is quite straightforward that the marked increased generosity of the unemployment 
benefit system, the sharp rise in trade union pressure and a remarkable rise in commodity 
prices produced the sudden rise in equilibrium unemployment at the end of the 1960s, it 
seems difficult to understand why the same equilibrium rate has not fallen faster and further 
(possibly, near the 1960s level) once, since the mid-1980s, many of the original causes of its 
increase have gone into reverse; that is, commodity prices have come back in real term at their 
level of 1960s, the unemployment benefit system have become substantially less generous, 
and the power of trade unions has been broken down. Certainly, some benefits are still pro-
vided in a way that they encourage unemployment (for example, hosing benefits in high rent 
areas). To this it should be added that the recession of early 1980s increased the specific pro-
portion of long-term unemployment (which contributed to the persistence of high unemploy-
ment, since the long-term unemployed find it very difficult to come back in a job), as well as 
the decline in the value of North Sea oil production which put pressure on the trade balance 
(thereby raising the equilibrium rate of unemployment). 
 
Yet, the most important factor which seems to explain why the UK equilibrium rate remains 
high is the collapse in demand for unskilled workers since the late 1970s, induced by the 
widespread advent of technological industry and informatics on the one hand, and by the 
competition of new economic ‘tigers’ at the level of global trade. At the same time, increasing 
demand for skilled workers has outpaced its supply, thereby producing negative effects on the 
equilibrium rate. This means that in the UK skill shortages have caused inflationary pressure 
even when unemployment has been at a historically high level. The possible solutions should 
thus consist in programmes targeting the long-term unemployed and the unskilled, aimed at 
the same time to the provision of a higher level of training and education, as well as to the 
reform of benefit system. 
3.2. National policy instruments and benefits to fight unemployment 
Expenditure on social security is the largest single function of government spending. Over 30 
million people (more than half of the population) receive income from at least one social se-
curity benefit. For means-tested benefits such as income support, receipt of the benefit will 
depend upon the income of the claimant, as well as upon personal characteristics such as age 
and family type. For contributory benefits such as incapacity benefit, eligibility depends upon 
the right amount of National Insurance Contributions (NICs) paid by the claimant during her 
life. Some benefits, such as child benefit, are universally available to all people who meet 
some qualification criteria. 
 
Focusing in particular on unemployment benefits, the Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) is a tax-
able benefit and can be either contributory or means-tested. It was introduced by the  Conser-
vative  cabinet  and  replaced  unemployment  benefit  and  income  support  for unemployed 
people from 1996. Claimants of this benefit cannot work more than 16 hours per week, have 
to be able to start work immediately, and have to actively look for a job (attending interviews, 
collecting information or writing applications). The claimant must also sign a ‘job agreement’ 
with the Employment Service, in which she indicates the desired hours and type of job, plac-
Chapter 3: UK 
  
ing reasonable restrictions to preferences and offering his/her work for up to 40 hours per 
week. Refusing to take a job offer may result (if no justifiable reason is provided) in loss of 
JSA. There are two different types of JSA: 
1. Contribution-Based Jobseeker’s Allowance: This is paid for up to six months provided 
that the claimant have paid sufficient NICs in one of the two tax years prior to the beginning 
of the year in which the claimant claims the benefit. Claimants cannot have earnings above £5 
per week or be in receipt of income support. It is possible to receive contribution-based JSA 
regardless of savings, capital or partner’s earnings. 
2. Income-Based Jobseeker’s Allowance: This is a means-tested benefit which might be 
received by those who do not qualify for contribution-based JSA provided that they have a 
sufficiently low income. Claimants cannot be in receipt of income support and must not be 
working more than 16 hours per week. Only one partner in a couple can receive income-based 
JSA, and the partner  of the claimant may not be working  for more than 24 hours per week.  
 
Other unemployment benefits include the Job grant, which is a one-off Euro156 ca. tax-free 
means- tested payment for people aged 25 or over who were previously receiving a  qualify-
ing benefit, such as jobseeker’s allowance, income support, incapacity benefit or severe dis-
ablement allowance, and who are starting or returning to full-time work. This work must last 
at least five weeks. While it is not a benefit specifically elaborated for unemployed people 
(but rather, for people on low income), the Income Support (IS) is indeed very similar to in-
come-based JSA. IS, which is a taxable and means-tested benefit, protects mainly lone parents 
and carers, people who are incapable of work and disabled people. IS claimants cannot be 
working more than 16 hours per week or be in full-time education. As with income-based 
JSA, claimants’ income (with earnings’ disregard as for JSA) must be less than their basic 
personal allowance. Lastly, the New Deal Employment Credit is a taxable and means-tested 
benefit consisting in a wage top-up which can be paid for up to 52 weeks. Recipients are those 
who start work, including self-employment. They must have adhered to a New Deal pro-
gramme, and they can also receive a training grant to help pay for work-related training. 
 
Since its election in 1997, the New Labour government has made a number of reforms to the 
labour market designed to move more people from welfare to work. These include the work-
ing families’ tax credit, changes to the system of national contribution, a national minimum 
wage, and, in particular, the New Deal. This was launched in 1998 by the New Labour gov-
ernment to help people to find work, that is, giving the chance to undertake meaningful work 
that might be valued by future employers. It started as a specific policy directed at young 
people aged 18-24 (The New Deal for Young People) but was soon extended to people over 
25 years old (New Deal 25+; and New Deal 50+), to single parents (New Deal for Lone Par-
ents) and to the disabled (New Deal for Disabled). The New Deal for Young Persons aims at 
helping long term unemployed into a stable employment status through the implementation of 
a set of actions. These include advice and guidance to improve job searching, training and 
education to improve participants’ skills, as well as provision of work experiences in envi-
ronmental task forces, in voluntary service or in some kind of subsidised employment. Ac-
cordingly, the programme which is co-ordinated nationally by the Employment Service 
through local Jobcentres, has relied on a wide network of governmental bodies and private 
corporations, charity societies and voluntary groups, environmental organisation and local 
associations, training providers and local authorities across the UK. The programme is univer-
sal, that is, eligible participants (young unemployed for more than six months) are due to par-
ticipate on the charge of having their subsidies cut off.  
 
The New Deal 25+ is aimed to those who are aged 25 or over and who have been claiming 
Jobseeker’s Allowance for 18 months or more out of the last 21. In this case too, New Deal 
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provides  the  individual  with  a  Personal  Adviser,  a  service  tailored  to  her  needs,  the 
possibility to draw an action plan for getting a job, practical help  and training, job-focused 
interviews skills. If the participant does not find a job during the first four months, a package 
of ‘full-time intensive help’ is agreed with the personal adviser, which includes at least two of 
the following: work experience, work placement with employers, occupational training and 
help with  motivation  and  the  skills  (communication,  presentation,  and  teamwork  
amongst  the others) needed to be employed. While maintaining many of the characteristics 
common to the programmes for Young People and 25+, such as the personal adviser and the 
provision of intense help in order to understand and fully grasp real chances and potentialities 
in the labour market, the New Deal is not compulsory for people over 50 years old, lone par-
ents and the disabled, who can voluntary take part in the programme by contacting their local 
jobcentre or Jobcentre Plus office. 
4. Public debates on unemployment: the claims-making data 
In democratically structured polities the public sphere has a strong impact on the formulation 
and implementation of public policies. In this sense, it is crucial to investigate whether the 
portrayed policy debates follow and/or take up debates within the mass-mediated public 
sphere. Moreover, it is of importance to analyse the structure and dynamic of these public 
discourses in regard to issues, actors and arguments in order to understand better who influ-
ences and/or dominates the public definition of the problem, of the political accountability 
and of adequate measures. Likewise, we need to trace back whether public debates exclude 
specific actors and/or issues, and which effect this exclusion has on the course of public de-
bates. It is to be assumed that public debates are responsive to pressing social problems and 
public worries, and thus quite inclusive for non-institutionalized actors such as the unem-
ployed.  
4.1. The basic outline of the newspaper analysis 
The British data on political claims-making were collected from every second edition of the 
Guardian Newspaper (Monday, Wednesday and Friday) and for the comparative part of the 
project cover eight years 1995-2002 inclusive. After data cleaning the British sample has 750 
cases. The unit of analysis was the single political claim, broadly defined as a strategic inter-
vention, either verbal or non-verbal, that is made in the public sphere on behalf of constitu-
ency group, which if realised would bear on the interests or rights of other groups or collectiv-
ities. In order to define a sample for political claims-making acts over unemployment, we 
included only claims-making acts that referred explicitly to unemployment, underemploy-
ment, or joblessness, and their related synonyms. This meant excluding those claims relating 
to the economy or labour market which were unrelated to the core political issue field of un-
employment. Claims referring to related fields (i.e. employment policy, economic develop-
ment policy, and other issues concerning the situation of the labour market or the creation of 
jobs) were coded only if they referred explicitly to the issue of unemployment. In addition, 
claims by organised groups of unemployed people were also coded, regardless of their the-
matic focus. Hence, our sample of claims-making is not directly compatible with a single pol-
icy field but focuses on the political issue-field relating to unemployment. For an instance of 
political claims-making there must by definition be a defined set of interests of a ‘beneficiary’ 
within the constituency of the unemployed, whose interests would be affected –either benefi-
cially or harmfully- if the stated political claim were realised. 
4.2. Media discourse on British unemployment 
Table 1 shows the beneficiaries the ‘unemployed constituencies’ from the sample of claims-
making. A first point to note here is that in more than half of cases (56.1%) political claims-
making acts defined a beneficiary of workers or labour groups whose interests were either 
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being challenged or promoted. This included workers at companies under threat or facing 
actual redundancy and the precariously employed (36.8%), workers and employees under 
threat in general (16.8%), the working poor (2.4%) and illegal workers (0.1%). A further four 
tenths of demands (43.6%) were about the interests of the actual organisations and groups of 
the unemployed, where among those categories specified by political claims the young unem-
ployed were prominent (8.9%). This indicates that more than half of the debate about unem-
ployment in the UK is about people who are actually in work, but who are facing the pros-
pects of unemployment in some way, whereas the remainder of the debate is about people 
actually in the condition of unemployment. We will use this distinction in investigating some 
of the findings below. 
 
The first row in Table 2 shows the distribution of claims-making acts per annum. This shows 
a fluctuating pattern of claims-making over the time period. The bottom row of Table 2 shows 
the unemployment rate in the UK which declines over the period from 9.8% in 1995 to 5.6% 
in 2001. At first glance it appears that the fluctuations in the overall level of claims-making 
over unemployment do not bear any clear relationship to the objective indicator for unem-
ployment over the period. However, when we distinguish between claims- making relating to 
workers’ facing the prospects of unemployment (row two) and claims-making relating to the 
unemployed (row three), we see that the overall trend in the political discourse about the (al-
ready) unemployed in general falls over the period as does the objective level of unemploy-
ment. This suggests that the political discourse over the unemployed is declining and becom-
ing pacified over the period in line with actual falls in unemployment. This issue field appears 
to be becoming less contentious. However, at the same time there appears to be a rise in over-
all contentiousness in the debates about workers’ threatened with unemployment. This leads 
to the tentative conclusion that in the British case, political contention over the actual unem-
ployed appears to be being replaced to a certain extent by political contention over the posi-
tion of workers’ under threat of unemployment. 
4.3. Public actors – who is involved in the media discourse 
A starting point for examining the actual contents of the British data-set is to look at the col-
lective actors who made demands or engaged in collective actions over the issue of unem-
ployment in our sample. Table 3 details the share of claims-making by collective actors in the 
field of unemployment politics. In Table 3 the detailed types of actors have been aggregated 
into eight categories: state and executive; political parties; private companies, employers’ 
associations, trade unions, non- governmental organisations acting specifically on behalf of 
the unemployed, the constituency of the unemployed acting for themselves, and finally, other 
civil society actors. A first point from Table 3 is the prominence of state and executive actors 
who make over a third of claims-making (35.5%) in the field of contentious politics over un-
employment. More than a fifth of all claims were made by British government and executive 
actors (22.0%), compared to only 3.5% by regional and local state actors, and a tiny 2.0% by 
the European Union, and 1.1% by extra-EU Supranational and transnational state bodies, such 
as the IMF, ILO and OECD. This shows that central government is by far the most dominant 
actor in debates about unemployment in the UK. 
 
A second point to note from Table 3 is private companies (19.7%) and employers’ associa-
tions (5.5%) together account for a quarter of claims-making. These business interests account 
for a larger share than the trade unions (16.7%), NGOs for the unemployed (0.8%), and the 
unemployed themselves (0.5%). This weaker showing of the representatives of labour inter-
ests, in contrast to the representatives of capital and commerce, perhaps gives a first indica-
tion of the extent to which British debates about unemployment are strongly shaped by eco-
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nomic interests, rather than workers’ or labour interests. In addition, the miniscule presence of 
the unemployed and NGOs working on their behalf, in the political debates about their inter-
ests, suggests that debates about the unemployed in the UK have been pacified, or that the 
unemployed are too weak to mobilise sufficient resources to enter the public domain. The 
unemployed themselves appear as ‘objects’ of the discourse about their condition and are not 
significantly ‘protagonists’. Of the other civil society actors who made up more than a sixth of 
demands (16.9%), by far the largest proportion (12.3%) were research institutes, think tanks, 
and universities, who in most cases were making political claims about unemployment issues 
on the basis of their research. Again this strong presence of a research community implies an 
institutionalised field of politics about unemployment, where grants and sponsorship are 
available for expert knowledge production on the problem. The only other type of civil soci-
ety actors who were present to any extent were Churches (0.7%) and welfare organisations 
(0.7%).  
 
The second two columns in Table 3 show the shares of claims by actors, first in the field of 
claims where the interests of workers’ under threat of unemployment were at stake, and sec-
ond in that where the unemployed were the constituency. This uses the distinction about the 
constituencies made in Table 1. The interesting point to note from the second two columns of 
Table 3 is that there appears to be two overlapping debates in the field of unemployment poli-
tics in the UK, the first about workers’ facing the prospect of unemployment, and the second 
about how to deal with the unemployed. Private companies (33.3%) are the most prominent 
actor in debates about workers’ facing unemployment, followed by the trade unions (22.8), 
and state and executive actors only come third (20.7%). The structure of this political field is 
very different to the one about the unemployed, where private companies make hardly any 
contribution (2.4%), and state and executive actors dominate the field making more than half 
of all claims (54.1%), followed by other civil society actors (24.3%), which as we have al-
ready stated are primarily research institutes, think tanks and universities. 
 
4.4. The role of the unemployed in public discussion 
 
As already determined before the unemployed themselves as well as their situation hardly 
play any role in the public discussion. Analysing whether the actors argue more in favour or 
disfavour of the unemployed we created a position-variable that shows for every claim if the 
intention is positive, negative or technocratic from the unemployed's point of view. We coded 
each act of claims-making with a score of -1, 0, +1, dependent upon whether if realised the 
political demand could be seen to be beneficial (+1) or harmful (-1) to the interests of the con-
stituency of the unemployed. A score of zero was given for cases of neutral positions, or 
where the expressed political demand was not clearly beneficial or detrimental to the interests 
of the unemployed constituency. When we calculate an average score for each collective ac-
tor, then we arrive at a figure between -1 and +1 for the aggregate position of the claims-
making of that actor with respect to the interest of the unemployed. The first column in Table 
4 shows the average position scores for the collective actors in the field of unemployment 
politics. We have arranged the actors in order running top-to-bottom from -1 (against to the 
interests of the constituency) to +1 (in favour of the interests of the constituency). This gives a 
first qualitative indicator for the positions of collective actors relative to one another in the 
issue field over unemployment. A first point to note from the first column of Table 4 is that 
the claims-makers who take up the most strong position against the interests of the unem-
ployed are private companies (-0.77) and employers’ associations (-0.12). At the other pole of 
the discursive field Trade Unions (+0.74), unemployment-specific NGOs (+0.83) and the Un-
employed (+1.00), make the case for the unemployed, though it should be note that we have 
already seen from Table 3, that the unemployed themselves and unemployment NGOs, have 
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only a very small presence in the public domain. Effectively this shows that the key protago-
nists in the British contentious field of unemployment politics are private companies (19.7%, 
-0.77), on one side, the trade unions on the other (16.7%, +0.74). This demonstrates evidence 
for a cleavage between the interests of capital, on one side, and the interests of labour, on the 
other. However, it is also worth noting that the position of private companies against the in-
terests of the unemployed is a discursive gulf away from the overall average (+0.24), and that 
state and executive actors (+0.39), other civil society actors (+0.57), and political parties 
(+0.68), take up a position that is far more supportive to the interests of the unemployed. This 
indicates that there are also more likely to be links and coalitions between actors on the pro-
unemployed side of the debate, whereas the private companies take up a more isolated posi-
tion in the public sphere. 
 
Turning to the second and third columns in Table 4, we have once more made a distinction 
between those claims made about the constituency of workers facing potential unemployment, 
and the constituency of the already unemployed. Here we see important differences that build 
on those already mentioned regarding the share of actors in the field (Table 3). A first point to 
note is that the strong position against the interests of the unemployed constituency that we 
find among private companies occurs with respect to workers under threat of unemployed, 
where indeed most of the claims by private companies were made (33.3% share of field, -0.84 
position). This appears as a highly contentious issue field, with this strong anti-constituency 
position of the private companies opposed by the strong pro-constituency position of the trade 
unions (22.8%, +0.72), who gain significant support from other civil society actors (11.2, 
+0.55) and to a lesser extent from the state and executive actors (20.7, +0.37). Here then it 
appears that the protagonists in the debate about workers under threat of unemployment are 
the private companies, whose position is challenged by the trade unions, supported by civil 
society actors and political parties, and the state also takes a stance that is also broadly defen-
sive toward the interests of workers under threat (+0.37, compared to an overall average of 
+0.06). By contrast, the third column shows a different structure of contentious issue field 
where the interests of capital are far less present. Employers associations make public de-
mands against the interests of the unemployed (4.0, -0.08), but the small amount of demands 
by private companies are actually in favour of the unemployed, most likely about increasing 
employment (2.4%, +0.50). The British political debate about the unemployed is strongly 
dominated by the state whose position is slightly below the overall position (54.1%, +0.40, 
compared to overall average +0.47). The trade unions again take up a pro- unemployed posi-
tion but again have much less to say than they do about workers under threat (8.8%, +0.79). 
In fact the political discourse about the unemployed appears to be a strongly pacified debate 
with the state dominating proceedings and then civil society actors (24.3%, +0.58), which are 
mostly universities and research institutes, presenting a stance that is more pro-unemployed 
than the government but not a large discursive distance away from the official stance. This 
gives the impression of an institutionalised field of politics where exchanges are between the 
state as a provider and researchers and expert knowledge providers who –often supported by 
the state- offer advice on policy directions. Overall then, there are clear differences in the de-
bate about unemployment, between the political field over the conditions of workers under 
threat of unemployment which is highly contentious, and the field over the unemployed, 
which is broadly uncontested, and where the debate most likely exists to specify policy alter-
natives for state and executive actors. 
4.5. Argumentative structure of the public discussion 
Another important aspect of claims-making is the contents of issues which are raised by po-
litical demands. Table 5 shows the type of issues that were mobilised by claims-making in the 
UK. It divides the issues into five main macro categories: socio- economic issues in relation 
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to the labour market; welfare systems and social benefits; (re)insertion into the labour market; 
issues relating to the constituency of the employed; and other issues. In general, these run 
from market issues (Non-state then state), to welfare provision, to measures for inserting the 
unemployed back into the labour market, and then issues relating to the conditions and situa-
tion of the unemployed themselves. We have included subcategories and sub-subcategories 
under these macro categories, which are of special interest for the British case. In addition to 
these issue categories, in the second column of Table 5 we have also aggregated the average 
position (-1 to +1) of all claims made in each issue category relative to whether they were for 
or against the interests of the unemployed. This then shows an indicator for to what extent 
overall claims-making about a specific issue is either favourable (+1) or unfavourable (-1) to 
the unemployed. The first striking finding from Table 5 is that issues mobilised about unem-
ployment in the UK are strongly focussed on market and economy type issues with 77.5% of 
all claims being about socio-economic issues relating to the labour market, in contrast to a 
tiny 1.2% about issues relating to the condition of the unemployed. An eighth (12.5%) of 
claims-making mobilised issues about measures for getting the unemployed back into the la-
bour market, and a further 7.5% covered issues about welfare and benefits to them. In addi-
tion, the second column in Table 5 shows that socio-economic issues were mobilised in a way 
that was in general more against the interests of the unemployed (+0.17), when compared to 
issues about welfare (+0.43) and measures for reinsertion into jobs (+0.56), and about the 
condition of the unemployed (+0.44). 
 
Indeed the major conflict lines in unemployment politics in the UK appear to come within the 
category of socio-economic issues relating to the labour market. Here we see that more than 
four tenths (41.7%) of issues over unemployment are about macro- economic issues which 
exclude state activities, and that these tend to go against the interests of the unemployed (-
0.10 compared to average +0.24). A key component here is that a quarter of all demands were 
about dismissals (25.9%) which of course are strongly against the interests of workers and the 
unemployed (-0.36). What we see here then in the British case is that a considerable propor-
tion of the debate about unemployment is constructed by economic issues that occur beyond 
the state’s activities and responsibilities. The UK appears to a large extent to be dominated by 
a free market type discourse focussed on macro-economic issues which shapes the way in 
which issues about unemployed are mobilised in the public domain. However, the is still a 
debate about the role of the state within the economy with almost a fifth of demands (18.7%) 
raising issues about the state’s regulation of the economy and its consequences for unem-
ployment, and a further tenth (9.5%) about state policies relating to the labour market. That 
economic development/promotion issues (+0.43) and state policy relating to the labour market 
(+0.49) both give an overall position that is much more favourable to the interests of the un-
employed than macro-economic issues (-0.10), shows a line of cleavage in the British debate 
over unemployment regarding the extent to which and how the state should intervene into the 
economy for the unemployed. 
4.6. Targets of public criticism 
One important element of political discourses resides in the fact that actors speak with each 
other, meaning that they refer to the statements or actions of other organizations, blame them 
for particular problems and/or call them into action. Thus, another important variable coded 
by our data refers to the institutional and organisational addressees on whom political de-
mands are made to do something about an issue in the fields of unemployment politics. Just 
over half of the acts of claims- making in our sample (52.4%) called upon specific actors as 
targets. Table 6 shows the share of claims-making which targeted specific types of actors as 
addressees. Perhaps unsurprisingly two thirds of all claims-making (66.2%) called upon state 
and executive actors to respond to issue defined within unemployment politics. The other 
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main actor category which appears as an addressee is private companies (19.1%). Once more 
by distinguishing between claims-making about workers facing unemployment and the unem-
ployed constituency in the second and third columns of Table 6, we see specific differences. 
Although we saw earlier that private companies have the largest share of claim-making in the 
field of claims-making over workers (33.3% - see Table 3) and more than state and executive 
actors, we see nonetheless that it is state and executive actors who are called upon most to act 
and politically respond to perceived problems in this field (53.9% compared to 30.7% private 
companies). This indicates that although private companies are the main protagonists in the 
politics about workers faced by unemployment prospects, it is still governments and the state 
which is called upon to take responsibility and respond to such problems.  
 
Turning to the problems relating specifically to the unemployed constituency, more than eight 
tenths of demands with addressees (83.0%) call upon the state and executive actors to do 
something about the situation. This once more underlines that the field of politics constructed 
around the unemployed and their interests appears mainly to be a form of client politics built 
around the central position of the state. Of course, state and executive actors could be those 
operating at the national, regional and local, European or supra/transnational levels. Another 
indicator for ‘Europeanisation’ or supra/transnationalisation of the field of unemployment 
politics would be if European actors were increasingly called upon by actors to do something 
in response to unemployment problems in the UK. Table 7 shows the scope of actors who 
were addressees of claims in our sample of claims-making acts. From Table 7 we see once 
more that the extent of ‘Europeanisation’ that we find is somewhat limited, with eight tenths 
(79.1%) of demands being made on national addressees, and fully six tenths being made on 
national state and executive actors (58.8%). 
4.7. The Role of the EU in public discourse 
Another focus of investigation of this project is to examine the extent to which political de-
bates about employment in the UK have been ‘Europeanised’. In the absence of the develop-
ment of a European public sphere in any meaningful sense so far, one would expect to find 
‘Europeanisation’ in national public spheres which remain dominant. One indicator for the 
‘Europeanisation’ of the political debates about unemployment would be finding evidence of 
European actors as prominent claims-makers within national public spheres. Table 8 shows 
the geographical scope of the claims-making actors who appeared in the British sample, 
where it was possible to determine this from the information in the article. We aggregated the 
sample into five categories regional and local; national; European (EU); supra/transational 
(Non European; and unspecific where the scope of the organisation or group was unclear. The 
supra/transnational category covers all acts by supra- national and foreign actors not including 
the EU, whereas as European (EU) includes the European Union’s supranational institutions, 
such as the Commission, as well as transnational and bi-lateral actors such as joint statements 
by the finance ministers of EU countries. 
 
Table 8 shows that three quarters of the actors who make demands political demands are na-
tional (75.5%), with a further twelfth (8.6%) sub-national actors. We find that 8.4% are Non-
EU supra/transational, and only 4.9% European. Overall this indicates a limited transnation-
alisation of the national field of politics over unemployment. The bottom row of Table 8 gives 
the average position of the claims- making by different actors aggregated actor scope. It is 
interesting that the supra and transnational actors have an overall position that is strongly 
against the interests of the unemployed (Non EU -0.57, EU -0.08) when compared to national 
(+0.31) and especially regional and local actors (+0.61). This indicates that debates carried by 
supra and transnational actors generally make demands that go against the British unem-
ployed. In addition, we see that most of the non-EU supra-nationalisation comes from private 
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firms (34.5% of claims-making by private firms is supra/transnational non EU). A large pro-
portion of these demands are made by multi-national private companies. This demonstrates 
that the political cleavage over unemployment has a dimension which relates to economic 
globalisation. On one side, international private companies act against the interests of the 
British unemployed, whose interests are defended most strongly by actors at the regional level 
(+0.61) and then by national actors (+0.31) on the other. 
 
Although the state and executive claims-makers are predominantly national (80.8%), it is 
worth looking at what European state and executive actors (who account for 5.7% of claims 
by state and executive actors) do in the unemployment field. A first point is that when aggre-
gated these European state actors have a position that is lower than average (+0.20 compared 
to average +0.24) relative to the interests of the unemployed. Again it appears that political 
globalisation does not necessarily bring demands that are supportive of the national unem-
ployed. We do find examples of the EU commission challenging the British government re-
cord on employment, such as Employment and social affairs commissioner Padraigh Flynn 
presenting a Report on the Future of Social Protection in the EU showing that the British un-
employed are worse off than in other main European industrial countries. In addition there 
joint initiatives like that of the Amsterdam Treaty where EU governments signal their com-
mitment to balance concerns for market economic efficiency with action to combat 'social 
exclusion' of the unemployed. Also our sample includes the European Commission respond-
ing to key national crises about unemployment by fast tracking the provision of aid to South 
Wales in response to Corus's decision to close its steel plant in the region. There are also 
stated commitments to the unemployed including a joint declaration by the European Centre 
for Industrial Relations promising to make an effort to halve unemployment by year 2000. At 
the same time we also find national politics using the European stage as a forum for making 
demands, with Labour MEPs lobbying against the closure of the Corus Steel Plant, apparently 
with support of the national government. In another case, Conservative MEPs call for an EU 
directive granting temporary workers the same rights as part-time counterparts to be scrapped. 
Overall, however, these examples of the ‘Europeanisation’ of politics over unemployment are 
somewhat limited in number, and for the most part issues of unemployment politics appear to 
be fought out in the national arenas. 
 
We have also looked at the possibility of the Europeanisation of unemployment politics by 
looking at the scope of actors making claims, and the scope of addressees on whom demands 
are made. It is easier to determine the scope of actors than issues, which by definition are less 
easy to pin down, but in Table 9 we have also included issues which are framed with a Euro-
pean or Non-EU supra/transnational frame of reference. Our objective in Table 9 was to see if 
there is any discernible trend towards and increasing presence of Europe as an actor, as an 
addressee, or as a frame of reference, within the debates on unemployment politics. A first 
point from Table 9 comes from the issue scope. Although we find a greater presence of Non-
EU supra/transnational actors and addressees than EU ones, this is not the case for issues, 
where 5.5% are framed with reference to the EU, and only 1.3% as Non EU su-
pra/transnational. Many of the supra/transnational actors were multinational firms, but the 
international arena disappears as a focus of issues. In contrast we see that the EU remains. 
Perhaps this can be seen as an indication that the European Union is seen as a legitimate 
framework of interpretation for political issues because of the presence of a set of political 
institutions which are largely absent in the supra/transnational arena, with even organisations 
such as the WTO being dominated by nation states. However, perhaps the main point to draw 
from Table 9 is that at least from our data it is not possible to see any discernible pattern of 
Europe increasingly appearing as an actor, as an addressee, or as a frame of references for 
issues, over time at least from the debates over unemployment politics. 
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5. Political deliberation in the field of labour market policies 
The structure of public debates outlined above raises the question of whether policy delibera-
tions within the institutionalized arena of policy-making follows similar patterns and cleav-
ages. Is political decision-making and implementation governed by similar actors and interor-
ganizational relations, issues and agendas? And are institutionalised policy deliberations char-
acterized by different forms of social exclusion when compared with the public sphere?  
5.1. Interviews with political actors 
This report is based on 39 semi-structured interviews with main national and local actors 
within the contentious field of unemployment in the UK, focusing on direct action and in-
volvement of actors across the public and policy domains. In particular, interviews have been 
conducted with a) policy actors and state institutions, b) intermediary actors such as political 
parties, unions, and employers’ associations, c) non-governmental organisations, welfare as-
sociations and pro-beneficiary charities, and d) groups promoting direct mobilisa-
tion/participation of the unemployed themselves. The interview schedule for each category of 
actors has been specifically designed to analyse where these actors locate themselves in rela-
tions to other actors within the same field. The interviews have been coded in full and ana-
lysed with the use of SPSS software. They include not only qualitative in-depth questions 
(examining, for example, framing of the issues and ‘perceived’ role of legislative provisions 
and policies for structuring actors’ demands) but also sets of standardised questions which 
aim to investigate action repertoires, mobilisation and communication strategies, institutions 
on which demands are made, as well as relationships of influence, co-operation and dis-
agreement amongst different types of organisations in the field. This analysis of networks and 
relationships has been based on the elaboration of closed lists of actors engaged in the multi-
organisational field of unemployment in the UK, allowing the employment of techniques of 
(descriptive) network analysis. It should be emphasised that the questionnaire has also gath-
ered information on how actors across the public and policy domains see the potential influ-
ence of increasing European integration in the unemployment field. Interviewees have thus 
been asked to give more open-ended prognostic statements, thus allowing for comparison of 
opinions that are expressed by actors of different types. 
 
The selection of actors to be interviewed was first of all tackled through the examination of 
our claim-making dataset. This dataset was particularly useful to detect crucial policy-makers 
and intermediary actors in the unemployment field, although it did not provide sufficient in-
formation for the selection of organisations representing the interests of the unemployed (in-
cluding organisations of the unemployed themselves). This problem was addressed through an 
extensive analysis of practitioners’ publications, access to online primary sources, and per-
sonal knowledge of the researchers who were involved in the project. Following this process 
of selection, organisations were contacted via telephone in order to detect spokespersons who 
could provide answers to the specific questions of the interview schedule. Researchers then 
contacted these spokespersons via formal letter and arranged an appointment with a final 
email or phone-call. The final sample of interviewed actors includes 25 national actors and 14 
local actors (Table 10). The two interviews with church organisations have been included 
within the ‘local NGOs’ since the representatives of the Catholic Church and the Church of 
England have decided to speak exclusively on behalf of their own local areas. It should also 
be emphasised that one of our interviewed actors was fully engaged in unemployment mobili-
sation throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, and hence, could not provide any quantitative 
data that could be recorded in the following tables. Nevertheless, it made available extensive 
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and valuable in-depth qualitative knowledge on past and recent mobilisation of the unem-
ployed, which was particularly useful for the completion of this report. 
5.2. Organisational networks 
Having presented our interviewees with a same list of actors of different types (to which they 
have been free to add additional names), we have asked them to mention the most influential 
actors in the unemployment field. Although they have been elaborated on answers given to 
different versions of the same question (allowing for multiple mentions, three mentions, and 
one only mention respectively), tables 11A and 11B emphasise the importance of national 
policy actors, confirming the centralisation and nationalisation of the British unemployment 
field. In particular, the Treasury and the Department for Work and Pensions emerge as the 
two most important actors in the field. They are followed by Jobcentre Plus (another national 
policy actor), and the Labour Party, which, in spite of its ‘intermediary’ role, is likely to be 
perceived as a national policy actors, given its hold on government since 1997. Perhaps, it 
should be noticed that local actors seem to give a more than proportional share of mentions 
for the Labour Party. This can be explained, however, by the predominance of this party in 
the local council of our selected local case study, that is, Barnsley in Yorkshire.  
 
In addition, it is important to emphasise that the rank-ordered lists of the most mentioned or-
ganisations in tables 11A and 11B is matched by the actors’ indication of their main targets in 
tables 12A and 12B. Indeed, it is just natural that national policy-makers are the most impor-
tant targets of claim-making in the unemployment field (something which can is also con-
firmed by the analysis of the claim-making dataset). Table 12A and 12B, however, show that 
the order between Treasury and Department for Work and Pensions is reversed. This latter 
department is now in the first place. Furthermore, the Department of Trade and Industry 
emerges as a crucial target, although it is hardly mentioned or considered to be influential in 
the previous table. At the same time, table 12A shows that the Labour Party is a crucial target 
within the unemployment field. It is clearly its very nature of (influential) intermediary actor 
between people and institutions which makes this party so important as a target within the 
unemployment field. Yet, as it has already been noticed in the previous section, table 12B 
indicates that our local case study crucially impacts on the aggregate data of table 12A, since 
the local government in Barnsley is under Labour control. 
 
As regards relationships of co-operation, our data crucially show that in general actors in the 
unemployment field are not interested in co-operation with grassroots groups of the unem-
ployed themselves, with little exception for few non-governmental organisations. Figure 1 
includes a graphical representation of the web of co-operative ties between all the actors 
which have been interviewed, that is, the nodes of the figure. Each tie between two nodes in-
dicates the existence (and the direction) of a relationship of co-operation between a pair of 
them. The first evident characteristic of this network is its fair density, owing to the fact that a 
large number of actors are linked to each other. It is graphically clear that some organisations 
stand out for their activity of co-operation, such as the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) and the 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), while the organisations more ‘isolated’ interact 
directly at least with another central actor, and hence, they are no more than a few edges away 
from any other organisation within the network. Of particular interest, however, is the portion 
of network amongst non-governmental organisations, whose intervention is in favour/on be-
half of the unemployed. The evident characteristic of this portion of network consists of its 
very low density, with a large number of actors disconnected with each other or merely re-
lated through relatively long paths. Although the issue-field is characterised by some good 
contacts between different types of actors, independent organisations working on behalf of the 
unemployed appear to be unwilling to forge a broad web of reciprocal linkages of close co-
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operation, while aiming to keep some basic degree of information exchange within the net-
work. 
 
By contrast, Fig. 1 indicates a good amount of ties across hierarchically different positions, 
despite the fact that they are not the normative expectation. In fact, the entire field is domi-
nated by the development of extensive linkages which connect organisations across the public 
and policy domains. It is thus evident that in the unemployment field, different types of or-
ganisations aim to access different social positions in order to acquire additional resources. 
On the one hand, policy-makers are interested in the support which pro-unemployed volun-
tary organisations can provide in terms of welfare services, production of knowledge, sharing 
of expertise, and public legitimisation. On the other hand, pro-unemployed organisations ob-
tain in exchange a privileged access to higher political positions and financial resources, thus 
reinforcing their organisational strength and public acknowledgement. In sum, the entire is-
sue-field is ‘vertically’ stretched, with increasing competition amongst pro-unemployed actors 
to reach the top level of the policy domain and gradual detachment of the beneficiaries (the 
unemployed themselves) at the bottom of the public domain. To complete the analysis of in-
ter-organisational networks, Fig. 2 includes a graphical representation of the web of ties of 
disagreement between all the actors which have been interviewed, that is, the nodes of the 
figure. Each tie between two nodes indicates the existence (and the direction) of a relationship 
of disagreement between a pair of them. It is clear that this network has lower density when 
compared to the previous web of co-operative ties, due to the fact that a higher number of 
organisations have avoided to foster relationships of disagreement with other actors in the 
field. 
5.3. Action forms of actors 
The British national context in terms of action forms is considered to be traditionally more 
pacified than other European national contexts. As regards the unemployment field, ideologi-
cal and class conflicts are expressed particularly through competition of organised interests, 
rather than through direct mass participation and disruptive protest. Direct action in the spe-
cific field of unemployment has been used at times during the 1980s and early 1990s, when 
large mass marches for jobs took place throughout the UK. Yet, it is rather accurate to say 
that there has been little visible direct protest on this issue during the last ten years, with only 
limited action initiated by organisations of the unemployed themselves. In addition, the data 
show that different types of actors make use of a wide repertoire of techniques, with the only 
exception of court actions. Table 13 sums up the range of strategies that actors use across the 
public and policy domains. Policy-makers rely on media-related strategies to inform the gen-
eral public, while they use strategies to directly inform the public to reach practitioners. They 
can also hire public relations firms, run advertisements, and poll the public. Intermediary ac-
tors and non-governmental organisations make a crucial use of their good access to policy-
makers, engaging in a good range of techniques to target policy-makers, either directly (lob-
bying politicians and co-operating with public officials) or indirectly (relying on media-
strategies and providing research for consultation).  
 
5.4. The role of the unemployed within unemployment policies 
Although table 13 shows a fair use of strategies which aim to mobilise the public, a more de-
tailed examination of our data indicates that these strategies are often based on techniques 
which consist merely in direct mail fund-raising. The data show, in fact, that within the public 
domain all the actors make only a very limited use of protest, with the only exception of a 
particular unemployed organisation, namely, the Network of Unemployed Centres Combine. 
In sum, while they have been the objects of crucial restrictive reforms, the unemployed have 
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generally shown only limited capability for direct action. They have engaged in protests 
against government throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, but they have not 
voiced their claims beyond the local level during the last decade, mobilising only occasionally 
and as result of specific industrial disputes. The British unemployed have thus relied on the 
direct support of pro-unemployed organisations, which have put on the side the recourse to 
protest action and fully engaged in activities of information, research, dissemination, lobby-
ing, consultation and co-operation with policy-makers.  
 
Certainly, the National Unemployed Centres Combine (CC) also campaigns directly on behalf 
of the unemployed, linking together various local ‘unemployed workers centres’ across the 
UK. CC stands out as the main organisation which actually involves unemployed people in its 
own organisational activities, working for the bottom-up promotion of their interest rather 
than for the elaboration of top-down solutions to tackle unemployment.  Nevertheless, it is 
crucial to emphasise that this organisation has increasingly reduced scope and intensity of its 
action since the mid-1990s, facing some major obstacles in promoting the direct involvement 
of the unemployed. In particular, its network of local centres has gradually shrunk due to in-
creasing funding constraints, halt of street protest, and new political conditions, which have 
forced groups to demobilise, strengthen their links with the unions, and to adapt to govern-
ment strategies.1 While some of these centres have dealt with the restrictive legislation of 
three successive New Right governments,2 other centres have decided to support actively 
government policies since the election of New Labour in 1997.3 CC has then worked to 
strengthen its ties with trade unions, churches and other civil society organisations in order to 
fill in its distance from the main policy-makers.4  
 
5.5. The role of the EU in political deliberation 
Drawing on widespread theses of Europeanisation, trans-nationalisation, and globalisation of 
social and political processes, it is crucial to assess the extent to which the ongoing processes 
of European integration and increasing relevance of EU institutions in the field of unemploy-
ment policy is linked to strategies and decisions of national actors. A crucial point of this re-
port consists in the analysis of actors across national public and policy domains in order to 
provide an empirical assessment of contemporary processes of trans-nationalisation, and in 
particular, Europeanisation. Table 14 sums up the range of strategies that British actors use at 
the EU level. Following a pattern which is similar to that of table 13 (action repertoire at the 
national level) the data show that intermediary actors and NGOs employ a good range of 
techniques to target policy-makers, either directly (lobbying politicians and co-operating with 
public officials) or indirectly (relying on media-strategies and providing research for consulta-
                                                 
1 Although several centres have continued to engage regularly in forms of mobilisation under the direction of 
CC, the last significant episodes of direct protest were organised in 1995, when three marches were organised to 
protest against the introduction of the ‘job seekers allowance’ by the Conservative government. One took place 
between Newcastle and Sheffield; another took place between Liverpool and Sheffield; while a local march was 
organised between Derby and Sheffield. 
2 Accordingly, these centres became providers of services to the unemployed rather than offering the means to 
organise and mobilise them per se. 
3 For example, the old ‘unemployment centre’ in Sheffield has changed its name in Centre for Full 
Employment’. It has accepted to co-operate with the New Labour government in supporting programmes that re-
engage unemployed people back into the labour market. In particular, the centre for full employment has taken 
active part in the Intermediate Labour Market (ILM), employing hundreds of people in project of community 
value and creating work in the third sector of the economy. 
4 At the end of 2003, for example, postcards reporting article 23 of the UN declaration of Human Rights (stating 
free choice of employment) were sent to each MP at Westminster, while a CC leader participated to the annual 
TUC conference in order to lobby on the issue of unemployment benefits and welfare reform. 
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tion). However, two crucial differences should be noticed between distributions of action 
forms at the national level and EU level across different categories of actors. First, table 14 
shows that organisations of the unemployed themselves are almost inactive at the EU level. 
The only exception consists in some limited action carried out by the Network of Unem-
ployed Centres Combine. The second difference consists in the distribution of ‘regular’ and 
‘occasional’ forms of actions which are employed. Tables 13 and 14  present aggregate data 
of  both ‘regular’ and ‘occasional’ forms of action, but it is important to highlight that  many 
of them are used regularly at the national level and only occasionally at the EU level, as well 
as the smaller size of action at the EU level. Table 14 also indicates that local actors are pro-
portionally more active in contributing to political campaigns and mobilising the public. 
 
In general, most interviewees are quite sure that the EU is playing an (increasingly) active 
role in the unemployment field, especially on the specific issue of job creation. Many local 
actors, for example, have debated at length both the negative and positive aspects of the direct 
intervention of the EU within the area of Barnsley through programmes such as ‘Objective 1’ 
and the ‘Territorial Employment Pacts’. It should be emphasised, however, that a substantial 
number of organisations are explicitly against an increase in European influence in unem-
ployment politics, as our data in table 15 seem to suggest. In fact, as regards future develop-
ments, other data in table 16 indicate that actors are evenly split between those who believe 
that the role of the EU will increase on the one hand, and those who think that the role of the 
EU will not be changing on the other. Only few actors think that the role of the EU will be-
come less important compared to the national level. In sum, it is clear that many actors be-
lieve that national sovereignties are dealing with an ongoing process of integration which 
might foster further EU intervention in the wider field of social policy. The very fact that this 
process appears to be difficult to control is a crucial element which reinforces actors’ opposi-
tion to an increase in European influence. 
6. Résumé and conclusion 
Focusing on the most relevant findings of this report, is should firstly be emphasised that in 
the UK public debates over unemployment politics deal with the position of workers or labour 
groups who are in a position of precarious employment more than with the conditions and 
position of the unemployed constituencies themselves. Making the distinction between these 
two types of beneficiaries –‘workers threatened by unemployment’ vs. the ‘unemployed’- was 
a useful distinction for the analysis. In addition, it should be highlighted that we have found 
no clear relationship between objective levels of unemployment and the level of public de-
bates over unemployment.  
 
It appears that in the UK political contention over unemployment issues is generally declining 
over the period as debates have become pacified. This process of pacification is not directly 
traceable to a decline in unemployment, but to political factors, and the weakness of the 
movement of the unemployed and the labour movement mobilising on behalf of the unem-
ployed. In the unemployment field, state policy responsiveness and co-optative strategies of 
policy-makers have discouraged the employment of visible political action in the public 
domain, strengthening the role of small specialist organisations that target relevant policy-
makers. Indeed, the definite demise of the unemployed protest movement in the public 
domain has occurred at the same time when the New Labour has taken on responsibility for 
government. Not only has this ‘opening up’ of institutional channels of access led pro-
unemployed organisations to strengthen their direct forms of institutional involvement in the 
political process, but it has attracted a wider range of voluntary organisations willing to seize 
the new resources, and whose input has further weakened the direct efforts of groups of 
unemployed. 
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The major conflict lines in British unemployment politics appear to come within the category 
of socio-economic issues relating to the labour market. Many issues over unemployment are 
about macro-economic issues which exclude state activities, and these tend to go against the 
interests of the unemployed. A key component was that a quarter of all demands were about 
dismissals which of course are strongly against the interests of workers and the unemployed. 
In the UK a considerable proportion of the debate about unemployment is constructed by eco-
nomic issues that occur beyond the state’s activities and responsibilities. The UK appears to a 
large extent to be dominated by a free market type discourse focussed on macro-economic 
issues which shapes the way in which issues about unemployed are mobilised in the public 
domain. However, there is still some debate about the role of the state within the economy. 
Overall there is a line of cleavage in the British debate over unemployment regarding the ex-
tent to which and how the state should intervene into the economy for the unemployed. 
 
Both claims-making and interview data show that the unemployed are more the ‘objects’ of 
political discourse and intervention on their condition, and do not feature significantly as 
protagonists. Indeed, the identification and contact with groups of unemployed was itself a 
problematic step of the research. State and executive actors dominate political debates and 
intervention on issues of unemployment, while civil society organisations such as research 
institutes and think tanks supply the government with information on the topic. Similarly, 
political parties seem to focus ‘pragmatically’ on the issue of unemployment, avoiding its 
over-politicisation and deep ‘ideological’ party competition. The unemployment field thus 
emerges as a very nationalised, centralised and institutionalised political space. All 
interviewees have mentioned only a very small number of organisations as influential actors, 
and in particular, the Department for Work and Pension, the Treasury, and the Job Centre 
Plus. Intermediary actors, welfare organisations and groups of unemployed play only a minor 
role. The importance of national and central policy-makers has been confirmed by the 
evaluation of actors’ networks. Indeed, the general trend is that non-governmental 
organisations are in regular contact with policy-makers, engaging in a direct relationship with 
institutional actors in order to gain some efficient means to influence formulation, 
implementation and development of policy. 
 
The role of the EU level is somewhat limited when compared to the national level. We did 
find some evidence for Europeanisation, with EU actors making demands in the British public 
domain, but these were as likely to be against the interests of the unemployed as for them. 
According to our data, political debates and action over unemployment remain for the most 
part a national affair. There is no clear evidence for an increase in the Europeanisation of the 
public debates over unemployment, either by an increase in EU actors in the national public 
sphere, in more issues with an EU frame of reference, or by the EU being increasingly called 
upon to politically respond. Furthermore, it is crucial to emphasise that if the EU plays a part 
within the British unemployment field, this is mainly through the action of intermediary ac-
tors and policy-makers. In fact, the European dimension seems to play a minor role also from 
the perspective of non-governmental organisations, which focus mainly at the national level 
since this is considered to be the central locus where unemployment policy is formulated. 
7. Appendices 
 
7.1. Tables 
 
Table 1: Constituencies of ‘the unemployed’ whose perceived interests are affected by acts of 
political claims-makng, Britain 1995-2002 
 
 % N
Workers’ and Labour force 
organisations and groups 
56.1 421
Working poor 2.4 18
Illegal workers 0.1 1
Employees’/workers’ groups 
(facing prospective or actual 
employment) 
36.8 276
Other unspecified workers, 
employees, (facing prospective 
or actual employment) 
16.8 126
Unemployed organisations 
and groups 
43.9 329
Young unemployed 8.9 67
Old unemployed 0.8 6
Women unemployed 1.5 11
Migrant/ethnic minority 
unemployed 
2.3 17
Disabled unemployed 3.1 23
Long term unemployed 2.3 17
Social welfare recipients among 
unemployed 
1.7 13
Other unspecified unemployed 23.3 175
ALL 100.0 750
 
 
 
Table 2: Level of Political Claims- making Over Time by Year – UK 1995-2002 (8 years) 
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 All N 
Share of all claims (%) 
 
13.7 6.8 12.5 11.9 22.5 6.8 18.5 7.2 100.0 750 
Workers facing 
Unemployment 
constituency 
8.6 9.0 5.9 12.6 29.9 5.5 24.7 3.8 100.0 421 
Unemployed constituency 
 
20.4 4.0 21.0 10.9 13.1 8.5 10.6 11.6 100.0 329 
Unemployment rate* (%) 
 
9.8 9.0 7.7 7.0 6.7 6.0 5.6 - N/A N/A
 
Average number of claims-making acts per annum is 93.75 (12.5% of total) 
*Figures from Labour Force survey (See British National Template p. ) 
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Table 3: Collective Actors’ Share in Political Claims-making by Type, and by Constituency of 
the Unemployed 
 
% Share in All Claims Share in Claims 
(Workers’ 
Constituency) 
Share in Claims 
(Unemployed 
Constituency) 
State and Executive 
 
35.3 20.7 54.1
Political Party 
 
4.5 4.5 4.6
Private Companies 
 
19.7 33.3 2.4
Employers’ 
associations 
5.5 6.7 4.0
Trade Unions 
 
16.7 22.8 8.8
NGOs for 
Unemployed 
0.8 0.0 1.8
Unemployed 
 
0.5 1.0 0.0
Other Civil Society 
 
16.9 11.2 24.3
All Actors 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 750 421 329
 
 
Table 4: Collective Actors’ Average Position on ‘the Unemployed’, by Actor type, and by Cons-
tituency of Unemployed 
 
% Average Position in 
All Claims (-1 to +1) 
Average Position in 
Claims (-1 to +1) 
(Workers’ 
Constituency) 
Average Position in 
Claims (-1 to +1) 
(Unemployed 
Constituency) 
Private Companies 
 
-0.77 -0.84 +0.50
Employers’ 
Associations 
-0.12 -0.14 -0.08
State and Executive 
 
+0.39 +0.37 +0.40
Other Civil society 
 
+0.57 +0.55 +0.58
Political Party 
 
+0.68 +0.79 +0.53
Trade Unions 
 
+0.74 +0.72 +0.79
NGOs for 
Unemployed 
+0.83 N/A +0.83
Unemployed 
 
+1.00 +1.00 N/A
All Actors +0.24 +0.06 +0.47
N 750 421 329
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Table 5: Issues raised by Claims-making in Unemployment Politics, and average position of the 
issue to the interests of the unemployed (-1 against, to +1 for) 
 
 % Average Position to 
Constituency 
N 
Socio-Economic Issues Relating to Labour 
Market 
77.5 -0.17 581 
Macro Economic Issues (Non state) 41.7 -0.10 313 
Economic change/competiveness (sectoral) 3.9 -0.10 29 
Economic change/competiveness (regional) 2.3 +0.65 17 
Social dialogue 2.8 +0.90 21 
Dismissals (not including state action) 25.9 -0.36 194 
Economic Development/Promotion Policy 18.7 +0.43 140 
Liberalization, flexibility 3.1 +0.22 23 
Economic effects of monetary policies on national 
economy
5.2 +0.38 39 
State subsidies to companies 2.1 +0.25 16 
State Policy Relating to the Labour Market 9.5 +0.49 71 
State Policy Relating to the Labour Force 2.4 +0.78 18 
Working Conditions 1.3 -0.10 10 
Targeted/Group Specific Employment Measures 3.9 +0.62 29 
Welfare Systems and Social Benefits 
 
7.5 +0.43 56 
Unemployment-Insurance System 2.1 +0.44 16 
Social Aid/Assistance 4.9 +0.41 37 
Minimum Wage/Basic income 2.4 +0.28 18 
Other 0.4 N/A 3 
(Re)Insertion into the Labour Market 
 
12.5 +0.56 94 
Active Measures of (Re)Insertion 9.6 +0.55 72 
Targeted/Group specific (re)insertion measures 7.5 +0.50 56 
Training and development for unemployed 2.5 +0.53 19 
Educational Issues 0.4 N/A 3 
Issues Relating to Constituency of Unemployed 1.2 +0.44 9 
Other Issues 1.3 +0.30 10 
All 100.0 +0.24 750 
 
Table 6: Addressees of Political Claims-making over Unemployment, and by  
Constituency of Unemployed 
 
% All Actors Workers’ 
Constituency 
Unemployed 
Constituency 
State and Executive 66.2 53.9 83.0
Political Party 2.5 1.8 3.6
Private Companies 19.1 30.7 3.0
Employers’ 
Associations 
1.0 0.4 1.8
Trade Unions 4.1 6.1 1.2
Other Civil Society 7.1 7.0 7.3
All Addressees 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 393 228 165
Proportion of claims-making acts with addressee 52.4% 
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Table 7: Addressee of Political Claims-making over Unemployment by Scope 
 
% Regional and 
Local 
National European Supra-
transnational 
Noneuropean 
Unspecified 
State and 
Executive 
1.8 58.8 4.6 1.0 0.0 
Political Party 
 
0.5 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private 
Companies 
1.5 10.7 1.5 5.1 0.3 
Employers’ 
Associations 
0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.3 
Trade Unions 
 
1.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Civil 
Society 
1.5 4.1 0.0 1.0 0.5 
All 
Addressees 
6.4 79.1 6.4 7.1 1.0 
 
Proportion of claims-making acts with addressee 52.4% 
N is 393 
 
Table 8: Scope of Collective Actors making Claims over Unemployment, and Average Position 
by Scope 
 
% Regional 
and local 
National European Supra-
transnational 
(Noneuropean) 
Scope 
Unspecified 
N 
All Actors 8.6 75.5 4.9 8.4 2.7 750
State and 
Executive 
6.8 80.8 5.7 3.0 0.0 265
All Non-
State and 
Executive 
7.4 72.6 4.5 11.3 4.1 485
Political 
Party 
17.6 82.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 34
Private 
Companies 
5.4 49.3 6.8 34.5 4.1 148
Employers’ 
Associations 
2.4 90.2 4.9 2.4 0.0 41
Trade Unions 8.8 76.0 6.4 0.8 7.2 125
NGOs for 
Unemployed 
40.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10
Other Civil 
Society 
4.7 89.0 1.6 0.8 3.9 127
All Actors 
Average 
Position 
+0.61 +0.31 -0.08 -0.57 +0.30 +0.24
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Table 9: Geographical Scope of Claims-making Actors, Institutional Addressees, and Issues 
over time (1995-2002) 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 All 
EU actor scope 
 
6.9 0.0 4.4 10.2 3.5 2.0 5.1 7.5 5.1 
Supra/International 
(Non EU) actor 
scope 
4.0 5.9 11.0 10.2 11.4 7.8 8.8 5.7 8.6 
N 101 51 91 88 158 51 136 53 729 
EU issue scope 
 
4.9 5.9 5.4 10.1 4.9 5.9 1.4 11.1 5.5 
Supra/International 
(Non EU) issue 
scope 
0.0 3.9 1.1 6.7 2.5 0.0 0.7 3.7 1.3 
N 103 51 93 89 163 51 139 54 753 
EU addressee scope 
 
7.2 0.0 6.1 7.5 4.9 0.0 8.8 16.7 6.3 
Supra/International 
(Non EU) addressee 
Scope 
0.0 8.3 8.2 11.3 1.9 3.4 17.5 4.2 6.6 
N 55 24 49 53 103 29 57 24 394 
 
 
Table 10: Distribution of interviewees across actor categories and national/local location5 
 
 National Local 
Policy Actors 3 2 
Intermediary 5 4 
NGOs 16 4 
Unemployed Organisa-
tions 
1 4 
Total 25 14 
 
 
                                                 
5 See Appendix 3 for a complete list of interviewed actors (and abbreviations). 
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Table 11A: List of the ten most frequently mentioned influential organisations by actor type 
(multiple options) 
 
 Policy Interm. NGOs Unemp. TOTAL 
HM Treasury 4 11 17 4 36 
Department of Work and Pensions 5 8 16 3 32 
Jobcentre Plus 4 8 15 3 30 
Labour Party 1 11 13 3 28 
Local Jobcentre Plus Offices 3 8 12 2 25 
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation 3 7 13 1 24 
Trades Union Congress 3 5 11 3 22 
European Commission 4 6 10 1 21 
 Institute for Public Policy 
Research 
2 5 12 1 20 
Confederation of British Industry 1 5 11 2 19 
 
Table 11B: List of the ten most frequently mentioned influential organisations by actor location 
(multiple options) 
 
 National Local TOTAL
HM Treasury 24 12 36 
Department of Work and Pensions 23 9 32 
Jobcentre Plus 22 8 30 
Labour Party 16 12 28 
Local Jobcentre Plus Offices 17 8 25 
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation 17 7 24 
Trades Union Congress 16 6 22 
European Commission 15 6 21 
The Institute for Public Policy Research 14 6 20 
Confederation of British Industry 16 3 19 
 
Chapter 3: UK 
  
Table 12A: The ten most frequently mentioned targets by actor type 
 
 Policy Interm. NGOs Unemp. TOTAL 
Department of Work and 
Pensions 
1 7 12 2 22 
HM Treasury 1 7 10 1 19 
Labour Party 0 7 7 4 18 
Department of Trade and 
Industry 
1 7 7 1 16 
Jobcentre Plus 1 5 9 1 16 
Trades Union Congress 3 3 7 1 14 
European Commission 2 5 4 1 12 
Liberal Democrats 0 6 4 2 12 
Local Authorities 0 4 6 2 12 
Conservative Party 0 3 6 2 11 
European Parliament 
(MEPs) 
2 6 2 1 11 
Local Jobcentre Plus 
Offices 
0 3 7 1 11 
 
Table 12B: The ten most frequently mentioned targets by actor location 
 
 National Local TOTAL
Department of Work and Pensions 16 6 22 
HM Treasury 16 3 19 
Labour Party 11 7 18 
Department of Trade and Industry 12 4 16 
Jobcentre Plus 14 2 16 
Trades Union Congress 11 3 14 
European Commission 9 3 12 
Liberal Democrats 7 5 12 
Local Authorities 8 4 12 
Conservative Party 9 2 11 
European Parliament (MEPs) 8 3 11 
Local Jobcentre Plus Offices 7 4 11 
 
Table 13: Distribution of action form categories expressed in standardised form by actor scope 
 
Action form Policy actor Intermediary NGOs Unemployed 
 National Local National Local National Local National Local
Media related .6 .6 .92 .7 .78 .7 .6 .33 
Informing the public .58 .5 .68 .7 .45 .3 .4 0 
Negotiating/lobbying .88 1 1 1 .87 .83 1 .66 
Consultation 1 .66 .85 .31 .84 .56 .75 .33 
Court-action 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Political campaigns n/a n/a .33 .66 .04 0 0 0 
Mobilizing the public n/a n/a .42 .43 .07 .21 .62 0 
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Tab. 14: Distribution of EU action form categories expressed in standardised form by actor 
scope 
 
Action form Policy actor Intermediary NGOs Unemployed 
 National Local National Local National Local National Local 
Media related .26 .5 .84 .5 .25 0.1 .06 0 
Informing the public .33 .2 .36 .36 .08 .05 0.2 0 
Negotiating/lobbying .55 0 1 .25 .47 .33 .66 0 
Consultation .77 .16 .65 .12 .34 .25 0 0 
Court-action 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Political campaigns n/a n/a .26 .25 .02 0 0 0 
Mobilizing the public n/a n/a 0.1 .28 .007 0 .25 0 
 
 
Table 15. Support for an increase in European influence by actor type 
 
 In favour Against Missing6 
Policy Actors 1 2 2 
Intermediary 4 4 1 
NGOs 8 6 6 
 
 
Table 16. Estimated future importance of EU policies by actor type 
 
 Increasing Unchanged Decreasing Missing 
Policy Actors 2 2 0 1 
Intermediary 4 2 2 1 
NGOs 8 8 2 2 
 
                                                 
6 A high number of missing values indicates that our interviewees could not tell anything about the position of their 
organisation. Interviewees were at times simultaneously in favour and against different aspects of European influence. 
Chapter 3: UK 
  
7.2. Figures 
 
Figure 1: Inter-organisational Relationships of Co-Operation within the Unemployment Field 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Inter-Organisational Relationships of Disagreement within the Unemployment Field 
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7.3. List of Interviewed Actors (and abbreviations) 
 
 
1. Barnsley Council (LocCoun.) 
2. Department for Work and Pension (DWP) 
3. Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) 
4. Jobcentre Plus – Barnsley (JCPloc) 
5. Treasury (Treas.) 
6. Catholic Hallam (C.Ch.loc) 
7. Confederation British Industry (CBI) 
8. Church of England (P.Ch.loc) 
9. Conservative Party – Barnsley (CPloc) 
10. Conservative Party (CP) 
11. Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) 
12. Labour Party – Barnsley (LPloc) 
13. Liberal Democrats (LD) 
14. Liberal Democrats – Barnsley (LDloc) 
15. Trade Unions Congress (TUC) 
16. TUC Yorkshire (TUCloc) 
17. Adam Smith Institute (ASI) 
18. Black Training and Enterprise Group (BTEG) 
19. Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion (CESI) 
20. Citizens Advice Bureau – Barnsley (CABloc) 
21. Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) 
22. Employment Opportunities (EO) 
23. Fabian Society (FS) 
24. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 
25. Institute of Employment Studies (IES) 
26. Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) 
27. National Youth Agency (NYA) 
28. New Policy Institute (NPI) 
29. One Parent Family (OPF) 
30. National Training Organisation (PAULO) 
31. Policy Studies Institute (PSI) 
32. Work Foundation (WF) 
33. Tommorrow's People (TP) 
34. Yorkshire Forward (YF) 
35. Centre For Full Employment (CFE) 
36. Churches Unemployment Group (CUG) 
37. Network of Unemployed Centres Combine (CC) 
38. Together for Regeneration (TfR) 
39. Vicar Marshall 
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